Democracy works best when every socioeconomic section finds representation and every voter can cast their votes for candidates they truly trust and respect.
Under the current system of territorial constituencies, people belonging to different socioeconomic sections have to elect a single leader, who can belong to only one community. Leaders from powerful, wealthy, and dominant communities have an advantage, while others rarely see their own leaders in positions of power, except as proxies for those same dominant communities.
Elections are highly expensive and competitive. Those serious about winning fight tooth and nail, outmanoeuvring and outspending one another, and using various inducements to influence voters. Once in power, they try to recover the money they spent and return favors to their supporters, leading to corruption and nepotism. Leaders unwilling to compromise their principles get elbowed out.
Constituency-based elections reduce elections to national and state legislatures to local contests. Local leaders see them as arenas in which to establish their supremacy over one another in controlling local affairs. The result is that local strongmen get elected to national and state legislatures, regardless of whether they have the vision required for those bodies.
The winning candidate typically gets about 30% of the votes of the total electorate. This means that more people do not trust the elected leader than do. With this happening in every election and every constituency, the country remains under minority rule, election after election.
Political parties come with their own agendas and ideologies. They use divisive politics to cultivate their vote banks and resort to appeasements. They routinely suffer from a lack of competent leadership and internal factionalism, while also being constrained by the expectations of the vote banks they cultivate. When push comes to shove, they put their own survival and well-being ahead of those of the nation.
Political parties monopolise the pathways to power. Leaders can hardly get elected without joining one, which means giving up their independent voice, toeing the party line, and supporting and defending all its leaders, past and present, as well as its ideologies, however outdated, flawed, or compromised. The performance, competence, and ethical standards of a party are ultimately constrained by those at the top.
Party-based politics also suffers from what we might call the ‘one-two-many’ problem. Sometimes, a single party dominates, leaving voters with no meaningful alternative, legislation without meaningful debate, and the executive without effective checks. Sometimes, two parties dominate, each with its own vote banks, polarising society, turning legislatures into theatres for political drama, and giving a political colour to every issue and policy. At other times, multiple parties prevail, resulting in coalition governments that can be fragile, chaotic, unstable, and ineffective.
The Constitution says that the executive is accountable to the legislature. But why would a political party question a government that it has itself elected? In fact, the party supremo often acts almost like a dictator, controlling not only the party but also the executive and the legislature. The PMO (and CMO in the states) often wields more power than the Cabinet. Cabinet approvals and legislative voting become mere formalities. Then there are other issues: persistent friction among the three branches of government, as well as between the states and the Centre; questions surrounding the independence and autonomy of constitutional offices such as the President of India and the Election Commission of India; and contentious issues such as delimitation.
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To address these issues, we propose a new electoral model. Under this model, there would be no constituencies. People belonging to different socioeconomic sections—not only SCs and STs, but also sub-castes within them, as well as BCs, OBCs, and others—could come together from across the nation (or the state, in state elections) to elect leaders of their own.
Voters belonging to a particular profession could also come together to elect their own leaders, just as teachers are allowed to elect their own representatives in some states today. Similarly, voters who care about visionary and principled leadership could come together from across the nation (or the state, in state elections) to elect such leaders.
We make this possible through a simple mechanism. We give each voter multiple votes—say, twelve—and let them distribute those votes among multiple leaders in whatever proportions they choose. We call this the Multiple Representation (MR) model.
Under this model, a woman from an agricultural family, for example, can cast some of her votes for a leader dedicated to farmers' issues, some for a leader committed to women's empowerment, some for a leader from her own community, and some for a leader known for tackling corruption. Similarly, a teacher from a Dalit community who is also Divyang can distribute his votes among leaders dedicated to Dalit upliftment, education, disability-related concerns, and perhaps even causes such as clean public toilets and toilets in trains.
Candidates would then be ranked by their vote counts, and the top-ranked candidates (for example, 543 for the Lok Sabha) would be declared elected. The voting power of the elected leaders would be proportional to their respective vote counts. We call this Proportional Voting Power (PVP).
Under this model, leaders can build their own voter bases by dedicating themselves to the concerns of a particular community, a particular field, or a particular cause. They need not join a political party and give up their independent voice. Political parties would lose their relevance, and the one-two-many problem would disappear. Debates in the legislatures would be issue-based rather than party-based.
The legislators, with independent agency and no obligations to any political party, could elect a broadly acceptable leader, such as P.V. Narasimha Rao or Atal Bihari Vajpayee, as the head of the executive. The executive head, in turn, could focus on administration without having to deal with the dynamics of political parties. The legislators, exercising their independence, could remove a non-performing executive head without fear or favour.
This model elevates legislatures into “Leadership Councils”, where leaders with organic connections to every community, cause, and field can find a seat at the table.
The diagram shows where MR would fit within the landscape of electoral models, using the classification developed by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), headquartered in Sweden, as a reference.
To our knowledge, no country currently uses this kind of model. It is an innovation in electoral design, much as UPI was an innovation in digital payments.
In an article that will soon be provided here, we will examine the MR model in its entire depth and breadth, including the concepts of Leadership Councils and PVP, explore how it would transform everything from election dynamics and legislative functioning to issues such as delimitation.
Nutan Vidhan